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Monday, December 30, 2019

മാതാപിതാക്കളെ സംരക്ഷിച്ചില്ലെങ്കില്‍ മരുമക്കള്‍ക്കും ഇനി അഴിയെണ്ണാം,മക്കള്‍ക്കും മരുമക്കള്‍ക്കുമൊക്കെ മാതാപിതാക്കളെ നോക്കിയേ മതിയാകൂ അല്ലെങ്കില്‍ അഴി തന്നെ

മാതാപിതാക്കളെ സംരക്ഷിച്ചില്ലെങ്കില്‍ മരുമക്കള്‍ക്കും ഇനി അഴിയെണ്ണാം,മക്കള്‍ക്കും മരുമക്കള്‍ക്കുമൊക്കെ മാതാപിതാക്കളെ നോക്കിയേ മതിയാകൂ അല്ലെങ്കില്‍ അഴി തന്നെ
https://youtu.be/QQAEUfEjs2M

Friday, December 20, 2019

Maintenance to daughter: Supreme Court has taken age as a factor for enhancement [Read the Order]

Supreme Court has enhanced the maintenance amount of a daughter considering her age. The order was passed by a three judges bench in the case titled ANIRBAN GHOSH vs SANCHITA GHOSH on 03.12.2019.

Supreme Court observed and held as under:

"We have heard Mr. Ashim Kr. Banerjee, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, who has submitted that in compliance of Order dated 05.10.2018, the appellant is regularly paying the maintenance of Rs.15,000/- to the daughter every month either by way of Demand Draft or by way of Cheque.

Since the daughter is stated to be aged about 16 years, in modification of Order of this Court dated 05.10.2018, we direct the appellant to pay the maintenance of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand) per month to the daughter, instead of Rs.15,000/- as ordered earlier, in the same manner, either by way of RTGS or by way of Demand Draft/Cheque, until further orders from this Court. In case of any difficulty, the appellant is at liberty to make a mention".

Read the Order here:


Wednesday, December 18, 2019

Wife is entitled for current market value if husband fails to return the ornaments [Read the SC Order]

Supreme Court in the case titled as Priya Prabhakaran vs D Santhosh Kumar on 06.12.2019 has held that if husband fails to return the gold items to wife, he has to pay the value of the gold on the date when repayment is made and not in respect of the date of application filed by the wife.

Supreme Court observed and held as under:

"The main issue which falls for determination in the present appeal is whether the High Court was justified in modifying the order of the appellate court by restricting the value of fifty one sovereigns of gold at Rs 4,59,000, the value which was quantified on the date of the filing of the application.

Having heard Mr V Shekhar, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and Mr Joseph Aristotle S, learned counsel appearing for the respondent and Mr.Nishe Rajen Shonkar, learned counsel for the State, we are of the view that there was no justification for the High Court to modify the order which was passed by the first appellate court.

The appellant sought the return of her gold ornaments weighing fifty one sovereigns and, in the alternative, the money equivalent which was quantified at Rs 4,59,000 on the date of the filing of the application.

Read also : Maintenance to daughter: Supreme Court has taken age as a factor for enhancement [Read the Order]

The Trial Court did not grant the relief which was sought but in appeal the Additional District and Sessions Judge correctly directed the return of fifty one sovereigns of gold or, in the alternative, the equivalent of their current market value.

The order of the High Court directing the first respondent to pay an amount of Rs 4,59,000 which was the value in 2008 will result in a miscarriage of justice.

If the first appellant cannot have the return of the fifty one sovereigns of gold in her possession she is entitled to the refund of the value of the fifty one sovereigns on the date of the repayment. Mr Shonker has placed on record the applicable rates for gold which are not in dispute. The value of fifty one sovereigns (equivalent to 480 gms) works out to Rs 15,25,920".

Read also : Abandonment or Abuse of Parents/Senior Citizens to be made a Punishable Offence, [Read the Bill]

Tuesday, December 17, 2019

Unmarried daughter who is above 18 can claim maintenance from father: High Court

An unmarried daughter is entitled to claim maintenance from her father even after attaining the age of 18 if her parents are divorced or estranged, the Bombay High Court has ruled.

Also, a woman can file an application on behalf of her major daughter to seek maintenance, Justice Bharti Dangre ruled yesterday.
Till the time the children were minors, their father paid a monthly maintenance for each child to their mother.

However, after the daughter crossed 18 years of age, the father refused to pay maintenance for her.
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Her mother, in her petition in the high court, claimed that though her daughter had attained majority, she was still financially dependent on her as she was pursuing higher education.

The woman also said that her two sons were not in a position to help out, as one of them was repaying his education loan and the other was yet to get a job.
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The woman, who is getting a monthly maintenance of Rs 25,000 from her husband, sought additional Rs 15,000 for the daughter.

The family court rejected her plea, saying that under section 125 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), maintenance is to be paid only for minor children.

Justice Dangre said in her ruling that as per the CrPC a major child is entitled for maintenance only if he or she is not able to maintain herself or himself due to any physical or mental problem.

But past judgements of Supreme Court and high courts have held that an unmarried major daughter can also seek maintenance if she is not financially independent (even if she doesn't suffer from any disability), the judge noted.

She directed the Principal Judge of the family court to consider th

Wednesday, November 27, 2019

The decree of divorce dissolving the marriage solemnised in India on the grounds of mutual consent by a court in NZ is very much valid in India and based on that the individuals can remarry anyone as per their desire. ... We have also filed in a court.

  • Mutual divorce from foreign. I got married in 2010 through special marriage act. After few months my husband went to NZ for higher studies. We never had cohabitation since we wanted to wait till social marriage which was supposed to be done in 2012-13. But in between we started facing so many issues and we both decided to part away. Now the thing is that I am in India and he is in NZ .he is having PR over there. We want to finish it quickly because we both want to settle down soon. According to him it is so fast if we done from NZ court.we will go for mutual divorce only. Now my question is , is this divorce will be valid in India. Will I have to face any difficulties if I remarry someone else in India after that divorce which will be ordered from NZ court? I am eagerly waiting for your reply. Thanks in advance.

Asked 4 years ago in Family Law from Bangalore, Karnataka
Religion: Hindu

In your case The divorce in Newsland court is not valid.the main reason is you are not domiciled and permanently resident NZ.More over the jurisdiction assumed by the foreign court as well as the ground on which the relief is granted must be in accordance with the matrimonial law under which the parties are married. The exceptions to this rule may be as follows: (i) where the matrimonial action is filed in the forum where the respondent is domiciled habitually and permanently resides and the relief is granted on a ground available in the matrimonial law under which the parties are married; (ii) where the respondent voluntarily and effectively submits to the jurisdiction of the forum as discussed above and contests the claim which is based on a ground available under the matrimonial law under which the parties are married; (iii) where the respondent consents to the grant of the relief although the jurisdiction of the forum is not in accordance with the provisions of the matrimonial law of the parties.

So better to apply divorce in Indian Court under Section 28 of the Special marriage Act, 1954 .And with draw the contesting case which you have filed 2 years before.

A petition for divorce may be presented to the District Court by both the parties together on the ground that they have been living separately for a period of one year or more, that they have not been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved.

Secondly on the motion of both the parties made not earlier than six months after the date of the presentation of the petition referred to it in sub-section (1) and not later than 18 months after the said date, if the petition is not withdrawn in the meantime, the District Court shall, on being satisfied, after hearing the parties and after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, that a marriage has been solemnised under this Act, and that the averments in the petition are true, pass a decree declaring the marriage to be dissolved with effect from the date of the decree.

 you sir for your prompt response.actually he is having permanent residentship of NZ. So can it be filed by him?

1. If both of you go for mutual consent divorce, then it is recognised and valid in India.

2. Even contested divorce on the grounds of Cruelty/Adultery/Desertion/Impotency are grounds that Indian Law recognises, so if the divorce is granted on these grounds – The decree is valid in India. Please note that in such a case it need not be validated in India by filing a suit or anything. It is the burden of person challenging the decree to discredit it.

3. You can remarry someone else in India after the divorce decree from NZ court.

4. The court shall take submissions of both sides into consideration before deciding the case – if it is not done – then decree does not hold good in India. In other words both spouses have to be present in the court.

5. If there is no consummation of marriage, both of you can opt for Annulment of marriage, wherein technically it will be considered that the marriage had not taken place and you will be treated as unmarried for all practical purpose and there will be no need of taking divorce.

. The ex parte divorce granted in NZ will not be valid in India. Hence I can't suggest you for the same.

2. The best option is to file mutual divorce in NZ which will be valid in India very much.

3. If the mutual divorce in NZ takes more than six months then apply for the same in India which doesn't take more than six months time.

All the best.

) divorce obtained by mutual consent in New Zealand would be valid in India

2) you are free to remarry in India after obtaining divorce


1) since your husband has permanent residency in New Zealand he can file for divorce in New Zealand

Quick solution to your concern is to ask him to come down to India toake appearance in the case, you have filed 2 years back so that you both can go for mediation and settle the matter amicably. After the settlement agreement drawn up, case will be converted in to mutual consent petitin and decree of dissolution will be granted.

As you are in India and he is in NZ hiw you can get Mutual consent divorce in NZ.?

Ask him to come down to India for fifteen days so that both of you can finish the legal aspects pending from years.

The quickest divorce in India will be by mutual consent which will take at least 6 months to get the marriage dissolved by a decree of divorce through a court. However this is not the situation in a foreign country when India couple approach a court in a foreign country where they live. In countries like US, UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, if the Indian couple decide to divorce or dissolve their marriage by mutual consent, it will be completed within a month.

Now to your questions;

We want to finish it quickly because we both want to settle down soon. According to him it is so fast if we done from NZ court.we will go for mutual divorce only. Now my question is , is this divorce will be valid in India. Will I have to face any difficulties if I remarry someone else in India after that divorce which will be ordered from NZ court?

The decree of divorce 

Monday, November 18, 2019

Supreme Court: No maintenance for wife who is working for sufficient salary

Supreme Court has declined to award any maintenance to wife who was working with sufficient salary, however, it awarded maintenance to the daughter.

A bench of Justice Shantanagoudar and Justice Khanna has passed the order in the case titled as KUSUM BHATIA vs SAGAR SETHI on 16.09.2019.

A decree was passed on 21.03.2009 in HMA 128/2008 by Additional District Judge (ADJ), Delhi, whereby the learned ADJ while allowing the petition under Section 13(1)(ia) and (ib) of the HMA, has passed a decree of dissolution of marriage in favour of the husband and against the wife.

Wife challenged the decree before the High Court. After detalied discussion, the High Court uphled the divorce saying "The parties have lived apart for approximately 10 years. Various police complaints /CAW Cell complaints were filed by the appellant and the family members of the respondent. There appears to be no possibility of the revival of the matrimonial relationship between the parties, and the relationship between the parties has irretrievably broken down. The marriage is as good as dead. The irretrievable breakdown is the result of the conduct of the appellant and the respondent/husband is entitled to a decree of divorce under Sections 13(1)(ia) and (ib) of the Act".

Wife then challenged the order before the Supreme Court which dismissed the petition. However, before dismissing the petition, the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of maintenance.

Read also : Domestic Violence vs Section 125 CrPC: Both are independent proceedings [Read the Order]

Supreme Court observed and held "Having heard learned counsel for both the sides on merits, we do not find any ground to interfere in the impugned order. In our considered opinion, the interest of justice would be met if the child, Kumari Preksha (aged about 16 years as of now) is awarded maintenance. Since, the petitioner is a working lady with sufficient salary, we decline to award any maintenance in her favour

Saturday, November 2, 2019

most important Judgments related to 125 Cr.P.C.*_

_*9 most important Judgments related to 125 Cr.P.C.*_
**************************

1. 125 CrPC cannot be filed twice, only 127 CrPC is allowed. (High Court Gujrat), Bench Hbl J. M. R. Shah, Order on 30-08-2011, Cr RA/69/2011 8/8, Revision Appeal No. 69 of 2011, Chauhan Anjanaben Jayantibhai Vs Chauhan Kanaiyalal Mohanlal.(Chauhan vs Chauhan)

2. No Multiple maintenances are allowed. (High Court Gujrat), Bench Hbl J. Akhil Kureshi, order on 21-10-2010, Special Appeal No. 2080 of 2010, SCR. A/2080/2010, 2/2, Hemlataben Maheshbhai Chauhan Vs State of Gujarat.

3. Multiple petitions of maintenance are not allowed. (High Court Delhi), Hbl J. Shiv Narayan Dhingra, order on 30-08-10, Crl. M. C. No. 130/2010 and Crl. M. A. No. 504/2010, Rachna Kathuria vs Ramesh Kathuria. Citation No. 173 (2010) DLT 289.

4. Double Jeopardy. Same relief of maintenance cannot be asked twice in two different courts. Litigant cannot ride two horses. (High Court Mumbai), Bench Hbl B. Wahane, J. Order on 17-07-1991. Ravindra Haribhau Karmarkar Vs Mrs. Shaila R. Karmarkar. Citation No. 1992 Cri LJ 1845.

5. Separate income of wife can be taken in to account in determining the amount of maintenance payable to her. (Supreme Court), Bench Hbl JJ. Sarkaria R. Singh, Chandrachud Y.V., Gupta A.C., Order on 17-10-1974, Bhagwan Dutt Vs Kamla Devi and Ors. Citation Nos. 1975 AIR 83; 1975 SCR (2) 483; 1975 SCC (2) 386; Citator R 1986 SC 984 (5), R 1987 SC 1100 (5).

6. No parallel 125CrPC and DVA for maintenance. (High Court Delhi), Bench Hbl J. Shiv Narayan Dhingra, order on 22-09-2010, Crl. R. P. No. 633 of 2010, Crl M. A. No. 15451/ 2010, Renu Mittal Vs Anil Mittal & Ors. Citation No. 173 (2010) DLT 269.

7. Interim maintenance increase illegal. (Supreme Court), Bench Hbl JJ. B.N. Agarwal and G. S. Singhvi, Order on 23-02-2009, Civil Appeal No. 1163/2009, SLP (C) No. 16742 of 2006, Sanjeev Gupta Vs Salini Gupta. Citation No. 2009

Monday, August 12, 2019

Section 125 CrPC: Supreme Court found the wife relying on a misleading proof but asked the husband to pay enhanced maintenance 

Supreme Court has directed the husband to pay enhanced maintenance to wife even when it found that the proof relied upon by the wife was misleading.

A bench of Justice Chandrachud and Justice Banerjee has passed the order in the case titled as Monica Morton vs Durgesh Kumar Pal on 01.08.2019.

Wife filed appeal in the Supreme Court for enhanced maintenance drawing the attention of the Court to the fact that for August 2016, the pay slip of the respondent indicated a gross pay of Rs 1,11,133. After deductions of Rs 25,328, the take home pay was Rs 73,427. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the husband has submitted that the reliance which has been placed by the wife on the pay slip for August 2016 is misguided as the pay slip is not an accurate representation of the husbnad’s monthly salary and take-home pay for the month of August 2016 as it included arrears of Rs 50,733. 

Supreme Court gone through pay slips of previous and subsequent months which shown the susbmission of husband correct but despite that, it proceeded to enhance the maintenance.

Supremem Court observed and held "Though the respondent has three children from the earlier marriage they are now majors. We are of the considered view, having regard to the position of the parties and their circumstances in life, that a total award of maintenance of Rupees Twelve Thousand per month including the amount awarded under the Domestic Violence Act should be granted. Hence, we order and direct that, in addition to the amount which has been awarded by the Family Court, under Section 125 of the CrPC, the appellant would be entitled to a further sum of Rupees Five Thousand per month commencing from the date of the judgment of the Family Court".

Tuesday, July 30, 2019

Section 125 CrPC vs DV Act: Wife can opt for both the remedies, SC has upheld the Delhi HC opinion [Read the Order]



Section 125 CrPC vs DV Act: Wife can opt for both the remedies, SC has upheld the Delhi HC opinion [Read the Order]


Section 125 CrPC vs DV Act: Wife can opt for both the remedies, SC has upheld the Delhi HC opinion [Read the Order]


Supreme Court has held that passing of an order under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 does not preclude the wife from seeking appropriate reliefs under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005.

A bench of Justice Chandrachud and Justice Banerjee has passed the order in the case titled as NIKHIL DANANI vs TANYA BANON DANANIon 22.07.2019.

Supreme Court states "Having heard Ms Geeta Luthra, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Ms Vibha Datta Makhija, learned senior counsel for the respondent, we are of the view that the High Court of Delhi was justified in coming to the conclusion that the mere passing of an order under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 did not preclude the respondent from seeking appropriate reliefs under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005".

The Supreme Court then uphold the judgment under appeal as "Hence, we decline to entertain the special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed".

But it clarified as "However, we only clarify that any observations made by the High Court on the merits of the claim of the respondent under Section 23 shall not come in the way of the appropriate court taking a view on the merits of the matter".

Read the Order here:

 

Tags : Domestic ViolenceSec 125 CrPC









Saturday, July 13, 2019

Attachment of property in divorce case



Attachment of property in divorce case

The first notice of divorce that I received is along with attachment of Property belonging to my deceased father. My father passed away in 2012. My wife filed for divorce in June 2014 with attachment of property for her stridhad and her earnings for 9.5 years of our married life. Reason stated was that they "strongly believe that the property might be sold"

My question here is:

1. Although my father has willed the property in my name. The property has not been yet transferred in my name. Since there is a attachment, I cannot transfer the property in my name.

2. Is such an attachment allowed, and if yes, how can the attachment be vacated.

3. Also deceased Father in laws property attachment for claims against husband. Is it allowed as per law.

4. My father was not alive when the dispute (Divorce) arose & how can his property be made a part of

Anil, this attachment is against the claim towards marriage gifts which are handed to husband and his family as a trustee and the same was accepted.

It is attachment before verdict. Is there any proof that you had received any gifts at the

1. Since there is attachment you cannot transfer the property 2. Normally this attachment will be vaccated at the time of final verdict. Yu deney all the alligations and submit a petetion to vaccate the stay. 3. yes it is allowed as per family court act.

I have signed in the SNDP (our religious denomination) register during the wedding ceremony for receipt of gold. Part of the Gold is in my custody. But she has filed that the entire gold is with me. I am ready to return what is in my custody. But she is also asking for her entire earnings of 9.5 years along with the gold.

We have one daughter 1.5 years old. I haven't seen her for the last 11 months. I have filed under G&W. The property needs to be taken care of. The case may take 4 to 5 years. If there is any border dispute (there are 6 neighbouring houses alongside the said property) or any other issues, am I legally allowed to represent as the property owner?

I have signed in the SNDP (our religious denomination) register during the wedding ceremony for receipt of gold. Part of the Gold is in my custody. But she has filed that the entire gold is with me. I am ready to return what is in my custody. But she is also asking for her entire earnings of 9.5 years along with the gold.

We have one daughter 1.5 years old. I haven't seen her for the last 11 months. I have filed under G&W. The property needs to be taken care of. The case may take 4 to 5 years. If there is any border dispute (there are 6 neighbouring houses alongside the said property) or any other issues, am I legally allowed to represent as the

As your father  has willed the property in your name you can represent. Yu are only responsible for the gold which is signed in SNDP registrar.

She cannot claim the expenses which she incurred for 9.5 years when she

1.  You can represent in the property dispute as the legal heir of the property.

2.  Unless her claim amount is clearly explained here, it is difficult to give clear advice. 

3.  You have to tell the court in clear terms that how much gold was the stridhan and how much she had taken back and how much is retained in your custody and your willingness to give it back to her in the presence of the court.

4.  About her last 9.5 years earning, again it does not come into stridhan and strictly speaking it need not be returned.  But if her earnings were very high and the expenses that could have incurred for her maintenance were not very much, then the remaining amount was her savings.  So, if her savings have been usurped by the husband for the maintenance of joint family or for his own aggrandisement, then, she can ask for return of her savings of the last 9.5 years. 

5.  You can ask  the family court to set aside the attachment order by moving appropriate application.  If you can show such financial guarantee to the court to show that  the court may set aside the attachment order,  if you are intended to sell the property. 




Bombay High Court
Shivlingappa Nijappa Tubchi vs Gurlingava Basappa Tubchi on 6 August, 1925
Equivalent citations: (1925) 27 BOMLR 1363, 94 Ind Cas 604
Author: Fawcett
Bench: Fawcett, Madgavkar

JUDGMENT Fawcett, J.

1. In this case one Gurlingava got an order for maintenance against her husband Basappa in October 1919 under Section 488,Criminal Procedure Code. Under that order the amount awarded as maintenance to her was Rs. 15 per month and it was expressly declared that that amount was 11 charge on the joint estate. This refers to the fact that Basappa was a member of a joint Hindu family consisting of himself and two brothers Dundappa and Shivalingappa. In the order with which we are now concerned it is stated by the Magistrate that these three brothers live separate, but their property is undivided. Gurlingava applied to the Magistrate, First Class, Hukeri, praying that a cloth shop, which it was alleged belonged to the three joint brothers at Sankeshwar, should be attached and the amount of maintenance due to her should be recovered in that manner. A warrant was issued for attachment of this property of the joint family accordingly, and the police under this authority attached certain sarees of the shop and produced them before the Magistrate, Shivlingappa then put in an application stating that the property attached by the police was not joint property, but was hie own self-acquired property, and asked that the attachment should therefore be removed He further contended that in any case the amount that could be recovered was only Rs. 180 and not Rs. 645 as claimed by Gurlingava, This latter contention was allowed by the Magistrate in view of the amendment of Section 488, under which maintenance for only one year prior to the date of the warrant is recoverable. On the other point, after inquiry he held that the property attached was not the separate property of Shivlingappa but was joint property, and that Shivlingappa was in possession of that property as manager of the joint family. He accordingly held that under the order of 1919, the maintenance chargeable on the joint family estate could be recovered from Shivlingappa in the manner proposed, namely by attachment and sale of the moveable property in question. From this order Shivlingappa has applied to us in revision.

2. The main contention of Mr. Desai on his behalf is that, assuming that the property in dispute is joint, as held by the First Class Magistrate, he has no jurisdiction to attach it under Section 488, Criminal Procedure Code, read with Section 386 of the same Code, This contention is based upon the fact that Section 488, Sub-section (3), authorises the Magistrate in case of breach of the order to issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines, that is to say, in the manner provided by Section 386. Under Sub-section (1) of that section the Court can issue a warrant for levy of the amount by attachment and sale of any moveable property belonging to the offender, and there is a form provided for this particular warrant, namely No 37 of Schedule V, and a similar form for a warrant under Section 488, namely No 41, in that schedule Both these forms use the same language as that in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 386, namely, moveable property "belonging to" the person against whom an order has been either for maintenance or fine. The warrant in this particular case was issued accordingly, and we are not now concerned with the question of the issue of a warrant to a Collector of a District to realise the amount by execution under Clause (6) of Sub-section (1) of Section 386. Mr. Degai's contention is that the words 'belonging to' mean 'belonging exclusively to" the person concerned, and that a share in joint family property is not property belonging to Basappa which can be attached and sold under this particular power. He further refers us to the new sub-section 6 (A) and (B) inserted in Section 88 of the Criminal Procedure Code in 1923, under which inquiries can be made into claims preferred or objections made to the attachment of any property attached under that section. Ho says that this indicates that the legislature contemplated the possibility of an interest in the property being attached and dealt with under Section 88, and therefore has made provision for inquiries into such claims or objections, but that the same does not apply to Section 886, This argument, however, does not seem to me to be very cogent because Sub-section (2) of Section 386 authorises the Local Government to make rules for the summary determination of any claims made by any person other than the offender in respect of any property attached in execution of a warrant. It, therefore, does at any rate provide machinery by which inquiries can be made into claims and objections in a similar manner to claims and objections under Section 388, The main question, however, still remains whether Clause (a) of Section 386, Sub-section (1), should he construed as referring to property solely belonging to a person and as excluding any interest in joint family property or the like. There is no doubt authority for Mr. Desai's contention. In The Queen-Empress v. Sita Nath Mitra (1892) I. L. R. 20 Cal. 478, the question was referred to the High Court whether joint moveable property war saleable under Section 386, Criminal Procedure Code, and the High Court in their order stated that "in regard to moveables the Magistrate, we think, can only attach moveables of which the deceased was sole owner." No reasons however are given for that particular ruling, and therefore it does not help us very much. There is another ruling to the same effect by the Madras High Court, recorded in Weir's Law of Offences and Criminal Procedure, 4th Edition, Vol. II, page 442. In that case the District Magistrate submitted for orders of the High Court certain proceedings in which a distress warrant had been issued for seizure and sale of moveable property belonging to the offender and two others, members of an undivided family. And the High Court say :-

The mode of levying pecuniary penalties must be strictly confined to the provisions of law that gives the jurisdiction. Section 307(386) of the Code of Criminal Procedure directs that the warrant for the levy of fine ' shall authorise the distress and sale of any moveable property belonging to the This language denotes things which may betaken by distress and then ' sold so an by the more act of sale to pass the property in thorn - not mere rights and interests or shares in joint moveables. In oases where the fine cannot be levied by the distress and still of the convict's own property, there is the very sufficient remedy of an alternative term of imprisonment.

3. Now weight must of course be attached to that ruling. But it seems to me unduly to limit by Judge-made law the wide words "movable property belonging to the offender," There are no doubt considerations iii favour of the property that is attached ordinarily belonging exclusively to the offender. This clearly obviates disputes which cannot be dealt with by a Criminal Court, so well as by a civil Court. On the other hand, I think, considerable weight must be attached to the fact that, if it .is held that only moveable property solely belonging to the offender can be attached under Section 386, a person who, as a member of joint Hindu family, has no separate property but a very valuable interest in the joint family property, entirely escapes the ordinary provision made for the recovery of a fine by attachment and sale of moveable property. I think that, before the Court holds that this was really intended by the legislature, there should be clearer ground than exists at present for taking that view. I am supported in this by the corresponding provisions of the law in regard to recovery of a decretal debt by attachment and sale of the judgment-debtor's moveable property. The present law is contained in Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, under which (subject to certain exceptions) the "property, moveable or immoveable, belonging to the judgment-debtor or over which, or the profits of which, he has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit, whether the same be held in the name of judgment-debtor or by another person in trust for him or on his behalf," is liable to attachment and sale in execution of the decree against him. Thus it will be noted that this section uses the same words ' belonging to." But Mr. Desai contends that the addition of the words "over which or the profits of which he has a disposing power," etc , extends the section to the case of a family property, and that the fact that the legislature did not insert corresponding words in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 386 supports his contention. No doubt that is an argument which would be entitled to consideration if Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure was the sole law to be considered in connection with this question.

4. The history of the teachability of a judgment-debtor's 'interest in joint family property goes back to very early limes, before even a Civil Procedure Code was enacted. Thus before Act VIII of 1859 was enacted, it bad been held by the Sudder Diwani Adalat in this Province that a judgment-debtor's share in joint family property could be taken in execution under a judgment against him obtained by his personal creditor. The rulings to that effect will be found stated in Vasudev Bhat v. Venkatesh Sanbhav (1873) 10 B. H. C. R. 139, and in the elaborate judgment of Westropp G. J. it was held thus (p. 160):-

It must be regarded as the settled law of this Presidency, not only that one of several co-parceneras in a Hindu family may, before partition, and without the assent of his co--parceners, sell, mortgage, or otherwise alien, for valuable consideration, his share in the undivided family estate, moveable or immovable, but also that such a share may be taken in execution under a judgment against; him at the suit of his personal creditor.

5. Now the station in Act VIII of 1859 corresponding to Section 60 of the present Code is Section 205, which runs as follows :-

The following property is liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree, namely lands, houses, goods, money, bank-notes, Government securities, bonds, or other securities for money, debts, shares, in the capital or joint stock of any Railway, Banking, or other Public Company or corporation and all other property whatsoever, moveable or immoveable, belonging to the defendant, and whether the sums be held in his own name or by another person in trust for him or on his behalf.

6. It will be noticed that the words used are " property belonging to " the defendant, and there are no words about his disposing power, such as are now contained in Section 60 of the present Code.

7. The Privy Council in Syud Tuffuzzool Hussein Khan v. Raghoonath Pershad (1871) 14 M. I. A. 40 considered a case where the judgment-debtor sued upon a chance of success under an award not yet made, which had been put up to auction and bought by him. Their lordships hold that, as this Section 205, to which I have just referred, used the word "property," and as mere right of suit was not "property" but a title to recover future property, the judgment creditor could not recover the amount he sought by that particular process. But the judgment also deals with the question whether such a share could not be attached and sold in execution under this Section 205. Their Lordships said (p, 50):-

Mr. Leith referred in his argument to the family property of Hindoos, and urged that such a share in such property may be attached and sold in execution. No doubt can be entertained that such a share is property and that a Decree-holder can reach it, It is specific, existing, and definite; but it is not properly the subject of seizure in this particular process, (that is to say, the process by which the decree-holder bad tried to get it in that particular case), hut rather by process direct against the Owner of it, whether by seizure or sequestration, or appointment of a Receiver.

8. In Kalee Pudo v. Ghoitun (1877) 22 W. R. 214 Couch G. J. refers to this ruling, and suggests that a creditor of a member of a joint Hindu family under this Section 205 has a remedy against the property to which his debtor may be entitled although it may be undivided property of the family, and it cannot be predicated that he has any definite share of it. That view has been followed at any rate in this Presidency. Therefore it seems to me that there is authority, in regard to the corresponding provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, for holding that the words "moveable property belonging to" suffice to cover a share in a joint Hindu family estate, so far as it consists of moveable property. Accordingly I am not prepared to go the length of Mr. Desai's contention and hold that, in no circumstances whatever, will a Magistrate be justified in directing the attachment of joint family property and having it sold.

9. On the ether hand, as I have already said, that is a method of recovery which should not ordinarily be resorted to. But in the present case we have the fact that so long ago as 1919 an order, whether right or wrong, was passed, under which the maintenance was made chargeable on the joint family estate. It seems to me very improbable that the present applicant Shivlingappa, who is the real brother of Basappa, although living separate from him, did not become aware of this order; and certainly, if it had come to his notice, as I think it certainly must have, it was his duty to have moved the Court at that time to have it set aside, if he objected to it. In the present case, in view of that order and his not having set it aside, I do not think that in revision there is sufficient ground for our interfering with the action taken by the Magistrate. I would, therefore, dismiss this application, Madgavkar, J.

10. I agree in the order proposed by my learned brother on two grounds.

11. The first is that there is an order by a competent Magistrate in 1919, directing the amount of maintenance to be a charge on the joint estate, That order has not been disturbed in appeal or in revision. The record and proceedings are not before us and it is impossible to say how far the present petitioner, the brother of the husband of Gurulingava, was or was not a party to that order and how far it was passed with his knowledge and consent, His present application is in revision against an order directing execution under Section 386against certain saris in the shop which Gurulingava, the wife of Basappa, alleged were his joint estate within the meaning of Section 488,

12. Secondly, the defence of the present petitioner before the Magistrate was that the saris which were attached were his own self-acquired property, and not joint property. On this point the Magistrate has recorded evidence and came to the conclusion that the saris were not the self acquired property of the petitioner, These two grounds suffice, I think, to cause the present application to fail,

13. The third question argued in this application mainly is whether the joint family property in which the offender has any interest, can or cannot be proceeded against under Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure The question to my mind is not free from doubt. The former prohibition against attachment of immoveable property belonging .solely to the defaulter has been removed by the express words of clause 6 (A) and (B) of Section 88,Criminal Procedure Code, as amended, so that the view of this Court under the old Code in Reg. v. Lallu Karwar (1868) 5 B.H.C.R. (Cr. C.) 83 no longer holds good. But as regards joint property the legislature, although it had before it the decision of the Calcutta High Court in The Queen-Empress v. Sita Nath Mitra (1892) I. L. R. 20 Cal. 478 and of the Madras High Court in the case in Weir's Law of Offences and Criminal Procedure, 4th Edition, Vol. II, p. 442, has not in express terms amended the section. The matter is, therefore, arguable and as it is not to my mind absolutely necessary for the decision of the present application, I reserve my opinion on it.

14 Per curiam. On the application of Mr, Desai, the Government Pleader not objecting, we modify the Magistrate's order in the last paragraph so as to read as follows :-

The potgi is chargeable on the joint family estate and Shivlingappa being the manager it should be recovered by attachment and sale of the moveable joint property in his possession, namely, saris that were attached.

Tuesday, July 9, 2019

Recent Supreme Court Judgments On Domestic Violence Act



Recent Supreme Court Judgments On Domestic Violence Act


The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 came into force on 26 October 2006. The stated objective of the Act is "to provide for more effective protection of the rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family".

The Supreme Court of India has made some significant interventions and interpretations in the operation of this law. The scope of this article is to consolidate almost every Supreme Court rulings in relation to this Act.

Shared Household and Alternative Accommodation

[S.R. Batra vs Taruna Batra (2006)]


About two months after the Domestic Violence Act came into force, the Supreme Court in this judgment, interpreted some provisions of the Act. In this case, the court dealt with the submission on behalf of the wife that the definition of shared household includes a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage had lived in a domestic relationship. The court held, referring to Section 17(1), Section 2(s), that the wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household, and a `shared household' would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member.

Also, Interpreting Section 19(1)(f), the bench comprising Justices S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju observed that the claim for alternative accommodation can only be made against the husband and not against the husband's in-laws or other relatives.Thus, in facts of the case, it was held that wife could not claim a right of residence in the property belonging to her mother-in-law'

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Requirements Of A 'Relationship in Nature of Marriage'

[D. Velusamy vs. D. Patchaiammal (2010)]


In this case, the court noted that the definition of 'Domestic relationship' in Section 2(f) of the Act includes not only the relationship of marriage but also a relationship `in the nature of marriage'.

As the expression 'relationship in the nature of marriage' has not been defined under the Act, the bench explained its meaning. The bench comprising Justices Markandey Katju and TS Thakur said that not all live in relationships will amount to a 'relationship in the nature of marriage' which must fulfill the below mentioned requirements (common law marriage requirements), and in addition the parties must have lived together in a 'shared household'.

• The couple must hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses.

• They must be of legal age to marry

• They must be otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage, including being unmarried.

• They must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out to the world as being akin to spouses for a significant period of time.

It was further held that merely spending weekends together or a one night stand would not make it a 'domestic relationship'. If a man has a 'keep' whom he maintains financially and uses mainly for sexual purpose and/or as a servant it would not, be a relationship in the nature of marriage', the Court said.

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Complaints Can Be Filed Against Female Relatives Of Husband

[Sandhya Manoj Wankhade vs Manoj Bhimrao Wankhade (2011)]


Interpreting the expression "respondent" in Section 2(q) of the Act, the Court held that the female relatives of the husband or male partner are not excluded from the ambit of a complaint. It was held that an aggrieved wife or a female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage can file complaint against a relative of the husband or male partner. The bench comprising Justices Altamas Kabir and Cyriac Joseph observed as follows:

"From the above definition it would be apparent that although Section 2(q) defines a respondent to mean any adult male person, who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person, the proviso widens the scope of the said definition by including a relative of the husband or male partner within the scope of a complaint, which may be filed by an aggrieved wife or a female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage."It is true that the expression "female" has not been used in the proviso to Section 2(q) also, but, on the other hand, if the Legislature intended to exclude females from the ambit of the complaint, which can be filed by an aggrieved wife, females would have been specifically excluded, instead of it being provided in the proviso that a complaint could also be filed against a relative of the husband or the male partner. No restrictive meaning has been given to the expression "relative", nor has the said expression been specifically defined in the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, to make it specific to males only… In such circumstances, it is clear that the legislature never intended to exclude female relatives of the husband or male partner from the ambit of a complaint that can be made under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005."

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Conduct Of Parties Prior To Coming Into Force Of DV Act Relevant 

[V.D.Bhanot Vs Savita Bhanot (2012)] 


In this case, the Supreme Court, upheld the view taken by the Delhi High Court that the conduct of the parties even prior to the coming into force of the Domestic Violence Act, could be taken into consideration while passing an order under Sections 18, 19 and 20 thereof. Even if a wife, who had shared a household in the past, but was no longer doing so when the Act came into force, would still be entitled to the protection of the Act, the bench comprising Justice Altamas Kabir and J. Chelameswar held.

Click to Read/Download Judgment

How To Test Live-In Relationship Is In Nature Of Marriage

[ Indra Sarma Vs. VKV Sarma (2013)]


 Whether a "live-in relationship" would amount to a "relationship in the nature of marriage" falling within the definition of "domestic relationship" under Section 2(f) of the DV Act and the disruption of such a relationship by failure to maintain a women involved in such a relationship amounts to "domestic violence" within the meaning of Section 3 of the DV Act? This was the issue considered by the Apex Court in this case.

The bench comprising Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan and Pinaki Chandra Ghose, after an elaborate discussion on the subject, laid down following guidelines for testing under what circumstances, a live-in relationship will fall within the expression "relationship in the nature of marriage"?

Duration of period of relationship- Section 2(f) of the DV Act has used the expression "at any point of time", which means a reasonable period of time to maintain and continue a relationship which may vary from case to case, depending upon the fact situation.


Shared household- The expression has been defined under Section 2(s) of the DV Act and, hence, need no further elaboration.


Pooling of Resources and Financial Arrangements-Supporting each other, or any one of them, financially, sharing bank accounts, acquiring immovable properties in joint names or in the name of the woman, long term investments in business, shares in separate and joint names, so as to have a long standing relationship, may be a guiding factor.


Domestic Arrangements-Entrusting the responsibility, especially on the woman to run the home, do the household activities like cleaning, cooking, maintaining or upkeeping the house, etc. is an indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage.


Sexual Relationship-Marriage like relationship refers to sexual relationship, not just for pleasure, but for emotional and intimate relationship, for procreation of children, so as to give emotional support, companionship and also material affection, caring etc.


Children- Having children is a strong indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage. Parties, therefore, intend to have a long standing relationship. Sharing the responsibility for bringing up and supporting them is also a strong indication.


Socialization in Public-Holding out to the public and socializing with friends, relations and others, as if they are husband and wife is a strong circumstance to hold the relationship is in the nature of marriage.


Intention and conduct of the parties- Common intention of parties as to what their relationship is to be and to involve, and as to their respective roles and responsibilities, primarily determines the nature of that relationship


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Deprecated Tendency To Implead All And Sundry As Respondents In Complaint 

[Ashish Dixit vs. State of UP (2013)]


In this case, the aggrieved wife had, apart from arraying her husband and her parents-in-law as parties to the proceedings, included all and sundry, as respondents in the complaint filed under DV Act. The bench comprising Justices H.L. Dattu and Chandramauli Kr. Prasad quashed the complaint against all respondents except husband and parents in law.

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HC Should Be Slow In Passing Interim Orders Interfering With Maintenance Order Passed Under DV Act

[Shalu Ojha  vs. Prashant Ojha (2014)]


In this case,The Magistrate  ordered  the husband to pay maintenance of Rs.2.5 lakhs per month. The husband assailed the order before the Sessions Court, which eventually dismissed the appeal as he did not comply with the conditional order. The interference made by the High Court in the order granting maintenance was assailed before the Apex Court,.

The Supreme Court bench comprising of Justice J. Chelameswar and Justice AK Sikri, observed that, in a matter arising under a legislation meant for protecting the rights of the women, observed that the High Court should have been slow in granting interim orders, interfering with the orders by which maintenance is granted to the appellant. 

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Wife Can Be 'Aggrieved Person' Even After Judicial Separation

[Krishna Bhatacharjee vs. Sarathi Choudhury (2015)]


It was held that only because a decree of Judicial separation is passed, a wife does not cease to be an 'aggrieved person' for the purpose of Domestic Violence Act. The bench of Justices Dipak Misra and Prafulla C. Pant noted that once the decree of divorce is passed, the status of the parties becomes different, but that is not so when there is a decree for judicial separation. The court observed that the finding of the court below that since the parties having been judicial separated, the wife has ceased to be an "aggrieved person", is wholly unsustainable

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Courts Not Powerless To Allow Amendment Of Domestic Violence Complaints 

[Kunapareddy @ Nookala Shanka Balaji vs. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari (2016)] 


In this case, the Court held that amendments of complaints or petitions filed under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act can be allowed. If the power to amend the complaint/application etc. is not read into the aforesaid provision, the very purpose which the Act attempts to sub-serve itself may be defeated in many cases, the bench comprising of Justices AK Sikri and RK Agrawalsaid.

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Unsuccessful Divorce Proceedings Cannot Adversely Affect Maintainability Of Application Filed Under DV Act 

[Rakash Nagardas Dubal Shaha VS. Meena Prakash Dubal Shahhas (2016)]


The Supreme Court, in this case, held that, unsuccessful divorce proceedings cannot adversely affect the maintainability of application filed by the contesting respondents under the Act. The Sessions Court, in the instant case, had held the application not maintainable on the ground that since the husband wife had initiated divorce proceedings at an earlier point of time, the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act which came into force only later. The bench comprising Justice Dipak Misra and Justice Shiva Kirti Singh upheld the High Court judgment that had set aside the Sessions Court order.

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Relief Under DV Act Can Be  Sought Against Minors, Women 

[Hiral P Harsora Vs. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora (2016)]


The Supreme Court struck down the words "adult male" before the word "person" in Section 2(q) of Domestic Violence Act holding that these words discriminate between persons similarly situated, and is contrary to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The bench comprising Justice Kurian Joseph and Justice RF Nariman said that if the "respondent" is to be read as only an adult male person, it is clear that women who evict or exclude the aggrieved person are not within its coverage, and if that is so, the object of the Act can very easily be defeated by an adult male person not standing in the forefront, but putting forward female persons who can, therefore, evict or exclude the aggrieved person from the shared household. The Court also said it is also possible that a non-adult 16 or 17 year old member of a household, can aid or abet the commission of acts of domestic violence, or who can evict or help in evicting or excluding from a shared household an aggrieved person. 

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'Domestic Relationship' Necessary To Permit A Party To Occupy 'Shared Household' 

[Manmohan Attavar Vs Neelam Manmohan Attavar (2017)]


In this case, it was observed that to issue an order under the Domestic Violence Act permitting a party to occupy a household, it is necessary that the two parties had lived in a domestic relationship in the household. The bench comprising Justice RF Nariman and Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul observed that the "domestic relationship", as defined under Section 2 (f) of the DV Act, refers to two persons who have lived together in a "shared household" as defined under Section 2(s) of the DV Act.

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Live-In Partner Can Seek Maintenance Under Provisions Of Domestic Violence Act

[Lalita Toppo vs. State of Jharkhand (2018)]


In this case, the Supreme Court observed that a live-in partner can seek maintenance under the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. A three judge bench made this observation while considering a reference to it from a two judge bench on the scope of Section 125 CrPC vis-a-vis live in relationship. The two judge bench had referred the matter while considering an appeal against Jharkhand High Court Judgment that held that Section 125 CrPC does not provide for the grant of maintenance to a woman who is not legally married to the person to whom such maintenance is claimed. 

Referring to provisions of Domestic violence Act, the bench  observed that the petitioner, in this case, would have an efficacious remedy to seek maintenance under the Act even assuming that she is not the legally wedded wife and, therefore, not entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It also said that economic abuse also constitutes domestic violence as per the provisions of the Act.

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Brother In Law Ordered To Pay Maintenance To Widow Under DV Act 

[Ajay kumar vs. Latha @ Sharuti (2019)]


In this case, the Supreme Court upheld an order passed under DV Act directing  a brother in law to pay maintenance to a widow. The lady and her deceased husband were residing at a house which constitutes ancestral Hindu Joint Family Property.The deceased husband and the brother in law jointly carried on a business of a kiryana store. The woman, filed a complaint under Domestic Violence Act alleging that, after the death of her husband she and her child was not permitted to reside in her matrimonial home. The Trial court passed an interim order granting monthly maintenance in the amount of Rs 4,000 to the woman and Rs 2,000 to the child. The brother in law was directed to pay the said amount. Rejecting the contention of the 'brother in law' that there is no provision to pass an order of maintenance against him, the bench comprising Justice DY Chandrachud and Justice Hemant Gupta observed that the substantive part of Section 2(q) indicates that the expression "respondent" means any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom relief has been sought