Progress of any society depends on its ability to protect rights of women: Supreme Court on woman's right to reside in shared household
The Court overruled the SR Batra verdict, where it was held that if the house belongs to the mother-in-law of the wife and does not belong to the husband, the wife cannot claim any right to live in the said hous
Progress of any society depends on its ability to protect rights of women: Supreme Court on woman's right to reside in shared household
The Court overruled the SR Batra verdict, where it was held that if the house belongs to the mother-in-law of the wife and does not belong to the husband, the
The Supreme Court today passed an important judgment on the interpretation and working of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
It held that the term “shared household” under Section 2(s) does not only mean a household of the joint family of which husband is a member or in which husband of the aggrieved person has a share (Satish Chander Ajuha v. Sneha Ahuja).
The judgment reads,
"The definition of shared household given in Section 2(s) cannot be read to mean that shared household can only be that household which is household of the joint family of which husband is a member or in which husband of the aggrieved person has a share."
The Bench of Justices Ashok Bhushan, MR Shah and Subhash Reddy was considering a petition filed by the father-in-law who claimed that the suit property is exclusively owned by him and was not a shared household. His son, it was contended, had no right in the property
The appellant had purchased a property in 1983. In 1995, his son got married and started staying on the first floor with his wife. In 2014, the husband filed for divorce alleging cruelty by the wife. In 2015, the wife filed a case against her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law under the Domestic Violence Act.
However in the trial court, the father-in-law stated that he and his wife were victims of domestic violence by the daughter-in-law and that he had no duty to maintain the daughter-in-law when the husband was alive.
The daughter in law had claimed that she cannot be removed from the house as it was a shared household, and that she had a right to reside therein. The trial court in April 2019 granted asked the daughter-in-law to handover possession of the property to the appellant.
In an appeal against this order, the Delhi High Court set aside the trial court decree and sent the matter back for fresh adjudication in December 2019. The High Court also noted that the husband needed to be made a party to the case.
Thus, the father-in-law approached the Supreme Court against this order, seeking that the trial court verdict be upheld.
The primary contention of the father-in-law stemmed from the verdict of the Supreme Court Bench of Justices SB Sinha and Markandey Katju in SR Batra and Anr. v. Taruna Batra, where it was held that since the house belongs to the mother-in-law of the wife and does not belong to the husband, the wife cannot claim any right to live in the said house.
However, overruling the SR Batra verdict, the present Bench held that “shared household referred to in Section 2(s) is the shared household of aggrieved person where she was living at the time.”
The Bench held that the SR Batra verdict did "not lay down the correct law", and did not correctly interpret Section 2(1)(s) of the 2005 Act. The judgment states,
"The definition of shared household given in Section 2(s) cannot be read to mean that shared household can only be that household which is household of the joint family of which husband is a member or in which husband of the aggrieved person has a share. The judgment of this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) has not correctly inter- preted Section 2(s) of Act, 2005 and the judgment does not lay down a correct law."
Supreme Court
The Court went on to hold,
"We, thus, are of the considered opinion that shared household referred to in Section 2(s) is the shared household of aggrieved person where she was living at the time when application was filed or in the recent past had been excluded from the use or she is temporarily absent.
The living of woman in a household has to refer to a living which has some permanency. Mere fleeting or casual living at different places shall not make a shared household. The intention of the parties and the nature of living including the nature of household have to be looked into to find out as to whether the parties intended to treat the premises as shared household or not."
Before delivering its judgment on a number of questions of law raised in the petition, the Court noted that the “progress of any society depends on its ability to protect and promote the rights of its women.”
The Bench went on to highlight the precarious position of women in Indian society, and the reasons why domestic violence cases go unreported.
"The domestic violence in this country is rampant and several women encounter violence in some form or the other or almost every day, however, it is the least reported form of cruel behavior. A woman resigns her fate to the never ending cycle of enduring violence and discrimination as a daughter, a sister, a wife, a mother, a partner or a single woman in her lifetime.
This non-retaliation by women coupled with the absence of laws addressing women’s issues, ignorance of the existing laws enacted for women and societal attitude makes the women vulnerable. The reason why most cases of domestic violence are never reported is due to the social stigma of the society and the attitude of the women themselves, where women are expected to be subservient, not just to their male counterparts but also to the male’s relatives."
The other questions the Bench dealt with included:
Whether the High Court has rightly come to the conclusion that suit filed by the appellant could not have been decreed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC?
"The power under Order XII Rule 6 is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. In the facts of the present case, the Trial Court ought not to have given judgment under Order XII Rule 6 on the admission of the defendant as contained in her application filed under Section 12 of the D.V. Act...
...Thus, there are more than one reason for not approving the course of action adopted by Trial Court in passing the judgment under Order XII Rule 6. We, thus, concur with the view of the High Court that the judgment and decree of the Trial Court given under Order XII rule 6 is unsustainable."
What is the effect of orders passed under Section 19 of the Act, 2005 whether interim or final passed in the proceedings initiated in a civil court of competent jurisdiction?
"Therefore, on conjoint reading of Sections 12(2), 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26 and 28 of the D.V. Act, it can safely be said that the proceedings under the D.V. Act and proceedings before a civil court, family court or a criminal court, as mentioned in Section 26 of the D.V. Act are independent proceedings, like the proceedings under Section 125 of the Cr. P.C. for maintenance before the Magistrate and/or family court and the proceedings for maintenance before a civil court/ family court for the reliefs under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act. However, as observed hereinabove, the findings/orders passed by the one forum has to be considered by another forum...
...The pendency of proceedings under Act, 2005 or any order interim or final passed under D.V. Act under Section 19 regarding right of residence is not an embargo for initiating or continuing any civil proceedings, which relate to the subject matter of order in- terim or final passed in proceedings under D.V. Act, 2005."
Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff for mandatory and permanent injunction against the defendant in the Civil Court is covered by the expression “save in accordance with the procedure established by law”?
"…we are of the opinion that the expression “save in accordance with the procedure established by law”, in Section 17(2) of the Act, 2005 contemplates the proceedings in court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, suit for mandatory and permanent injunction/eviction or possession by the owner of the property is maintainable before a Competent Court.
Thus, in appropriate case, the competent court can decide the claim in a properly instituted suit by the owner as to whether the women need to be excluded or evicted from the shared household."
Whether the plaintiff in the suit giving rise to this appeal can be said to be the respondent as per definition of Section 2(q) of Act, 2005 ?
Noting that it is now permissible under the definition of Section 2(q) to include females also, the Court held,
"To treat a person as the “respondent” for purposes of Section 2(q) it has to be proved that person arrayed as respondent has committed an act of domestic violence on the aggrieved person...
...We, thus, are of the view that for the purposes of determination of right of defendant under Sections 17 and 19 read with Section 26 in the suit in question the plaintiff can be treated as “respondent”, but for the grant of any relief to the defendant or for successful resisting the suit of the plaintiff necessary conditions for grant of relief as prescribed under the Act, 2005 has to be pleaded and proved by the defendant, only then the relief can be granted by the Civil Court to the defendant."
The appellant was presented by Advocate Prabhjit Jauhar. Senior Advocate Nidhesh Gupta along with Mohit Paul, Prashant Mehta and Himanshu Kapoor appeared for the respondent - daughter-in-law, while Senior Advocates Geeta Luthra and Jayant Bhushan appeared in a connected matter where the parties had arrived at a settlement.
