Kerala High Court Rules In Favour Of Registering Marriages Under SMA Via Video Conference, Expresses Concerns Regarding Implementation

The Kerala High Court on Monday ruled that considering the technological advancements in place, marriages under the Special Marriage Act (SMA), 1954 c

https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/kerala-high-court-marriage-under-sma-can-be-registered-through-video-conference-181014

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex (LGBTQI)

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex (LGBTQI) persons face specific obstacles when it comes to accessing many of their rights, including their right to social protection.

The terms lesbian, gay, bisexual and pansexual refer to people’s sexual orientation, that is, who they experience sexual attraction towards; while transgender refers to gender identity, that is, “someone whose gender differs from the one they were given when they were born”. Terms like genderqueer and non-binary refer to people who fall outside the construction of gender as male or female. Intersex people are born with physical or biological sex characteristics such as reproductive or sexual anatomy, hormones or chromosomes that do not seem to fit the typical definitions of female or male.

This is not an exhaustive list of terms: different cultures, both historically as well as today, have used diverse language which express the wide range of sexual orientations and gender expressions, such as “Two-Spirit”, which refers to Native American and First Nations people who fall outside Western gender norms, while “hijra” typically refers to South Asian individuals who were assigned male at birth, but identify as women or as a third gender.

LGBTQI people are entitled to the enjoyment of all the rights outlined in international, regional and domestic human rights law. Yet, due to strongly held cultural and social norms surrounding gender expression and sexuality, LGBTQI people are often excluded. The International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) recognizes this, stating that “social and legal discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, and intersex, is pervasive”.

However, recently, some nations have passed legislation to help protect some of these communities’ and individuals’ right to social protection. A human rights-based approach to social protection, and the development of social protection floors, can transform the lives of LGBTQI people, helping making all societies inclusive ones in which all members fully participate, and in which no one is left behind.

Legal Instruments

An Act for the recognition and registration of the gender of a person and to regulate the effects of such a change, as well as the recognition and protection of the sex characteristics of a person (Act No. XI of 2015)

This act recognizes the gender of a person and regulates the effects of such a change, as well as the recognition and protection of the sex characteristics of a person.

Legal Cases

LGBTQI+ Right to Housing in the United States

The Law The United States’ Fair Housing Act (FHA) 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 Section 3604(b) states that “…it is unlawful [t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, colour, religion, sex, […]

Resources

Denied Work: An Audit On Job Discrimination On The Basis Of Gender Identity In South-East Asia

This report looks into employment discrimination faced by transgender people while seeking employment in four countries in South-East Asia– Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. The findings from this study provide direct evidence of discrimination against trans people in job hiring practices in the region.

Equal Access to Public Restrooms

This brief outlines transgender and gender non-conforming persons’ right to adequate sanitation facilities in public spaces.

Workplace Rights and Wrongs

This brief outlines transgender and gender-noncomforming person’s rights at work.

Implementing Comprehensive HIV and STI Programmes with Transgender People: practical guidance for collaborative interventions 

This tool describes how services can be designed and implemented to be acceptable and accessible to transgender women. To accomplish this, respectful and ongoing engagement with them is essential. This tool gives particular attention to programmes run by transgender people themselves, in contexts where this is possible. It is itself the product of collaboration among […]

Guidelines for the Primary and Gender-Affirming Care of Transgender and Gender Nonbinary People

These guidelines aim to address these disparities by equipping primary care providers and health systems with the tools and knowledge to meet the health care needs of their transgender and gender nonconforming patients. Link to Guidelines

Social Protection for LGBT People: Challenges and good practices

How does social protection address the needs of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people? How can a rights-based approach be used to ensure that their needs are fully taken into account? In this video, Andrés Scagliola from the Social Development Department of the City of Montevideo discusses challenges and successes in mobilizing human rights instruments […]

Policy Perspective: Linking Social Protection and Human Rights

How can governments fulfil their obligation to provide social protection and respect the rights of all? Andrés Scagliola from the Government of the City of Montevideo, Uruguay, describes his experience developing and implementing policy that safeguards lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people’s right to social protection.

TOP 20 MAINTENANCE CASE LAWS IN FAVOUR OF HUSBANDS:

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*TOP 20 MAINTENANCE CASE LAWS IN FAVOUR OF HUSBANDS:-*

1. *Reduced interim maintenance*. (SC), Hbl J. R. M. Lodha, order on 20-07-2010, Appeal No. 5660 of 2010, Arising SLP (C) No. 6736 of 2007, Neeta Rakesh Jain Vs Rakesh Jeetmal Jain. Citation No. AIR 2010 SC 3540; (2010) 12 SCC 242; 2010 (7) JT I 76 (SC).

2. *Wife is not entitled to maintenance who deserted her husband.* (Supreme Court), Bench Hbl JJ. S. Ahmed & D. Wadhwa, order on 02-03-200, AIR 2000 SC 952, 2000(2) ALD Cri 15, 2000Cr. LJ 1498, Rohtash Singh Vs Smt. Ramendrei & Ors. Citation No. (2000) 3 SCC 180; JT 2000 (2) SC 553.

3. *Maintenance not granted as it is proved that wife wants to reside separately. No maintenance to deserting wife.* (HC Chhattisgarh), Hbl J., L. C. Bhadoo, order on 15 -02-2004, Crl. Revision No. 544/2003, Shiv Kumar Yadav Vs Santoshi Yadav.

4. *Husband can get PF details of wife.* (CIC, Delhi), Decision No. 1816/ IC (A) 2008, F No. CIC/MA/A/2007/00583, Prof M.M. Ansari, order on 10 Jan 2008.

5. *Wife guilty of contempt of court, maintenance denied with cost.* (HC Delhi), Hbl J. S. N. Dhingra, order on 25-01-2010, Cont. Case (C) 482 of 2008, Gurbinder Singh Vs Manjit Kaur.

6. *Children have to maintain their parents.* (High Court Gujrat), Hbl J. Akhil Kureshi, order on 09-02-2011, CR RA/759 of 2009, 4/4, Hasmukhbhai Narayan Bhai Viramiya Vs State & Ors.

7. *Conditions when maintenance to be paid.* (High Court Delhi), Mr. Pradeep Nandrajog J., order reserved on 02-04-2007, order on 14-04-2007, CM (M) No. 367 of 2007, Alok Kumar Jain Vs Purnima Jain. Citation No. 2007 (96) DRJ 115.

8. *All states amends in Sec 125 CrPC is invalid.* (SC), Bench Hbl M. Katju, Gyan Sudha Mishra JJ., order on 11 Jan 2011, Crl Appeal No. 107 of 2011, SLP (Crl) No. 6568 of 2009, Manoj Yadav Vs Pushpa Yadav. Citation No. 2011 : 1 L.W. (Crl.) 520.

9. *Wife should clear that she is unable to maintain her. No maintenance to enable wife who deserted her husband.* (High Court Karnataka), Bench Hbl J. M. Patil, order on 13-02-1980, Haunsabai Vs Balkrishna Krishna Badigar. Citation Nos. 1981 Cri LJ 110; ILR 1980 KAR 612; 1980 (2) Kar LJ 158.

10. *Maintenance on actual earning.* (High Court Delhi), Hbl J. Shiv Narayan Dhingra, order reserved 25-07-2008, order on 18-09-2008, CM (M) No. 1790 of 2006 and CM No. 1435 of 2006, Ritu Raj Kant Vs Anita. Citation No. 154 (2008) DLT 505.

11. *Maintenance denied for working wife.* (High Court Madras), Hbl A. S. Venkatachalamoorthy J., order on 21-06-2002, Kumaresan Vs Aswathi. Citation No. (2002) 2 MLJ 760.

 12. *No maintenance for capable and working wife.* (High Court Maharastra), Hbl J. C. Chitre J., order on 24-03-2000, Smt. Mamta Jaiswal Vs Rajesh Jaiswal. Citation No. 2000 (4) MPHT 457; II (2000) DMC 170.

 13. *No maintenance to earning wife, only to children.* (High Court Karnataka), Hbl K. Manjunath J., order on 22-08-2005, AIR 2005 Kant 417, ILR 2005 KAR 4981, Dr. E. Shanthi Vs Dr. H K. Vasudev.

 14. *No Maintenance to working wife in 125 CrPC.* (High Court Madras), Hbl P. Sathasivam J., order on 21-01-2003, Manokaran @ Ramamoorthy Vs M. Devaki. Citation Nos. AIR 2003 Mad 212; I (2003) DMC 799; (2003) I MLJ 752 (Mad), CMP No. 16264 of 2002.

15. *No Maintenance to wife, but only to child.* (HC Mumbai), Hbl J. B. L. Marlapalle, order on 18-7-2009, Appeal No. 20 of 2005 and 144 of 2005, Smt. Manju Kamal Mehra Vs Kamal Puskar Mehra. Citation Nos. 2010 AIR (Bom) 34; 2009 (5) AIIMR 798; Legal/ 360.in 114983; LS/Bom/2009/1374.

16. *No maintenance U/s 125 CrPC when wife deserts hubby without cause and also she is earning. No Maintenance to capable wife, but only to child and no maintenance to wife living in adultery.* (HC Uttaranchal), Hbl J. Alok Singh, order on 18-11-2009, Crl. Rev. No. 201 of 2006, Smt. Archana Gupta & ors Vs Rajeev Gupta.

 17. *Wife should clear that she is unable to maintain herself.* (HC Allahabad), Hbl J. B. Katju, order on 25-03-1976, Manmohan Singh Vs Smt. Mahindra Kaur. Citation No. 1976 Cri LJ 1664.

18. *No Maintenance if wife is working.* (HC Uttaranchal), Hbl J. Dharamveer, order on 25-10-2010, Crl Rev. No. 88 of 2002, Vikas Jain Vs Deepali @ Ayushi. Citation No. LAWS (UTN) 2010-1-36.

19. *Wife living separate troubled in family no maintenance.* (HC Madras), Hbl J. P. R. Shiva Kumar, order on 22-02-2008, Crl. R. C. No. 1491 of 2005, Marimuthu Vs Janaki. Citation No. AIR 2003 Mad 212; I (2003) DMC 799; (2003) I MLJ 752.

20. *All states amends in Sec 125 CrPC is invalid.* (SC), Bench Hbl M. Katju, Gyan Sudha Mishra JJ., order on 11 Jan 2011, Crl Appeal No. 107 of 2011, SLP (Crl) No. 6568 of 2009, Manoj Yadav Vs Pushpa Yadav. Citation No. 2011 : 1 L.W. (Crl.) 520.

Is Consent of the Husband Needed for an Abortion in India?

Abortion Gender Right to Equality and Non-Discrimination Sexual and Reproductive Rights India

Is Consent of the Husband Needed for an Abortion in India?

by Aradhana Cherupara Vadekkethil | Feb 17, 2018

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About Aradhana Cherupara Vadekkethil

Aradhana is a DPhil candidate, with the Faculty of Law, University of Oxford. Her research focuses on rape  adjudication in India; she seeks to highlight through her research how culturally dominant notions, underlying preconceptions and prejudices about rape percolate through the talk of these cases in a variety of settings and shape their outcome. Her research is supervised by Professor Laura Hoyano. Prior to the DPhil, she read for the Master of Philosophy in Law (2019) and Bachelor of Civil Law (2018) at the University of Oxford, and the BA LLB (Hons.) at the National Law University, Delhi (India). She was awarded the Modern Law Review Scholarship in 2021 and the Gopal Subramaniam Scholarship (Somerville College, University of Oxford) in 2019. She is Editor of the Oxford Human Rights Hub Blog, Associate Editor with the Indian Law Review and was Co-Chairperson of the Oxford Pro Bono Publico (2018-19).

Citations

Aradhana Cherupara Vadekkethil “Is Consent of the Husband needed for an Abortion in India?” (OxHRH Blog, 17 February 2018), <https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/ is-consent-of-the-husband needed- for-an-abortion-in-india> [date of access].

The Indian Supreme Court on 27th October, 2017 in the case of Anil Kumar Malhotra v. Ajay Pasricha, dismissed a man’s petition who was seeking damages from his wife as she had terminated her pregnancy without his consent. The husband had contended that the pregnancy was illegal as per the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act (MTP Act) 1971 as the specific consent of the father of the unborn child was not obtained and that the termination was without any medical need. He had filed a suit against his wife, her parents, her brother and the medical practitioner, claiming Rs 30 lakhs as damages for the mental agony caused due to the ‘illegal termination’ which was ‘cruel, illegal and unethical’ according to the husband.

In 2011, the Punjab and Haryana High Court had deliberated on “whether the express consent of the husband is required for unwanted pregnancy to be terminated by a wife?” The Court noted that under Section 3(4)(b) of the MTP Act, only the consent of the pregnant woman undergoing the termination of pregnancy is required. Moreover, the Court held that an unwanted pregnancy as per Explanation II to Section 3(2) of the Act is a grave injury to the physical or mental health of the woman. The Court remarked in paragraph 17 that “if the wife has consented to matrimonial sex and created sexual relations with her own husband, it does not mean that she has consented to conceive a child. It is the free will of the wife to give birth to a child or not. The husband can not compel her to conceive and give birth to his child”. The Court further remarked in paragraph 22 of this High Court judgment that “A woman is not a machine in which raw material is put and a finished product comes out. She should be mentally prepared to conceive, continue the same and give birth to a child” and concluded that the husband has no right to compel his wife not to terminate the pregnancy and that he had no right to sue his wife for compensation. This was a progressive step by the High Court as it considered the woman the “best judge” of whether or not to continue with a pregnancy. The Court recognised the personal right of a woman to continue with the pregnancy or abort the foetus given that it is her who must be to mentally prepared to carry out a pregnancy.

The Supreme Court on 27th October 2017 in Anil Kumar Malhotra v. Ajay Pasricha dismissed the appeal filed by the husband against the Punjab & Haryana’s High Court decision. By dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the Punjab & Haryana High Court’s decision which laid down that the woman has the right to decide about the abortion and that consent of the husband is not required as per the Act. The judgment of Malhotra is a progressive step in recognising and implementing the reproductive rights of women because it recognises their autonomy.

While the Supreme Court’s judgment of upholding the Punjab & Haryana’s High Court decision is a reason for celebration, there is more to be achieved in this area. The MTP Act is 46 years old and has not been amended despite medical advancements made in the field. The Medical Termination of Pregnancy (Amendment) Bill, 2014 notes the medical advancements made in this field and one of the clauses provides that a healthcare provider may, “in good faith”, decide to allow abortion between 20 and 24 weeks if, among other conditions, the pregnancy involves substantial risks to the mother or child, or if it is “alleged by the pregnant woman to have been caused by rape”. The 2014 Bill has been pending in Parliament since the past three years. And in such situations, women or young girls are left to the mercy of the Court’s decision in case the pregnancy is beyond 20 weeks.

Thus, while Supreme Court’s dismissal of the husband’s petition in the case of Anil Kumar Malhotra, is a progressive step; it represents only one step in developing the law in line with the rights of women.

സ്ത്രീധന കേസിന്റെ പേരിൽ സർവീസിൽ നിന്ന് പിരിച്ചു വിടപ്പെടുന്ന ആദ്യത്തെ സംസ്ഥാന സർക്കാർ ഉദ്യോഗസ്ഥനാണ് കിരൺ കുമാർ

വിസ്മയ കേസിലെ കുറ്റാരോപിതൻ, ഭർത്താവ് മോട്ടോർ വെഹിക്കിൾ ഇൻസ്‌പെക്ടർ കിരൺ കുമാറിനെ സർവീസിൽ നിന്ന് പിരിച്ചുവിട്ടതായി  ഗതാഗതമന്ത്രി ആൻറണി രാജു തിരുവനന്തപുരത്ത് വാർത്താസമ്മേളനം നടത്തി പ്രഖ്യാപിച്ചിരുന്നു.  ഈ പിരിച്ചു വിടലിന് അടിസ്ഥാനമായി അദ്ദേഹം ഉദ്ധരിച്ചത് 1960-ലെ കേരള സിവിൾ സർവീസ് നിയമം ആണ്. 

എന്താണ് ഈ 1960 ലെ സിവിൽ സർവീസ് നിയമം?

1960 ലാണ് കേരള സിവിൽ സർവീസസ് (ക്ലാസിക്കേഷൻ കൺട്രോൾ ആന്റ് അപ്പീൽ) നിയമം പാസ്സാവുന്നത്. ഈ നിയമത്തിന്റെ പതിനൊന്നാം വകുപ്പ് പരാമർശിക്കുന്നത് സർക്കാർ ഉദ്യോഗസ്ഥർ ഏതെങ്കിലും കേസുകളിൽ പ്രതികളായാൽ നേരിടേണ്ടി വരുന്ന അച്ചടക്ക നടപടികളെക്കുറിച്ചാണ്. ചെയ്യുന്ന കുറ്റത്തിന്റെ ഗൗരവത്തിന് അനുസൃതമായിട്ടാണ് അച്ചടക്ക നടപടിയുടെ കടുപ്പവും ഉണ്ടാവുക. ഈ നിയമത്തിന്റെ  ഒന്ന് മുതൽ നാലുവരെയുള്ള ഉപ വകുപ്പുകളിൽ ശാസന മുതൽ പിഴ വരെയുള്ള ചെറിയ നടപടികളാണ് ഉള്ളതെങ്കിൽ, അഞ്ചു മുതൽ അങ്ങോട്ടേക്ക് തരംതാഴ്ത്തൽ, നിർബന്ധിത വിരമിക്കൽ, പെൻഷൻ കുറവുചെയ്യൽ, സർവീസിൽ നിന്ന് നീക്കം ചെയ്യൽ, പിരിച്ചു വിടൽ തുടങ്ങി പലതുമുണ്ട്.

സിവിൽ സർവീസ് നിയമത്തിന്റെ ഈ വകുപ്പ് പ്രകാരം ഒരു ഉദ്യോഗസ്ഥനെ നീക്കം ചെയ്യും മുമ്പ്, പ്രസ്തുത വ്യക്തിക്കെതിരെ ഇതേ നിയമത്തിന്റെ പതിനഞ്ചാം വകുപ്പിൽ പറയും പ്രകാരം കൃത്യവും വിശദവുമായ ഒരു വകുപ്പുതല അന്വേഷണം നടത്താൻ സർക്കാരിന് ബാധ്യതയുണ്ട്. ആദ്യഘട്ടത്തിൽ ഉദ്യോഗസ്ഥന് ആരോപണങ്ങൾ വ്യക്തമാക്കിക്കൊണ്ട് മെമോ നൽകപ്പെടും. ഈ വകുപ്പിന്റെ അന്വേഷണ ചട്ടങ്ങൾ പാലിച്ചുകൊണ്ട്‌ നടത്തപ്പെട്ട സുതാര്യമായ ഒരു അന്വേഷണത്തിൽ സംശയാതീതമായി കുറ്റം ചെയ്തെന്ന് തെളിഞ്ഞതിനെത്തുടർന്നാണ് പിരിച്ചുവിടൽ എന്നാണ് മന്ത്രി അറിയിച്ചത്.

ഇങ്ങനെ ഈ എട്ടാം ഉപവകുപ്പ് പ്രകാരം നീക്കം ചെയ്യുന്നത് തുടർന്ന് രണ്ടാമത് ഒരു സർക്കാർ ജോലിക്ക് ശ്രമിക്കുന്നതിൽ നിന്നുകൂടി പ്രസ്തുത ഉദ്യോഗസ്ഥന് അയോഗ്യതയായി മാറും. പിരിച്ചു വിടപ്പെടുന്നയാൾക്ക് പെൻഷൻ, ഡിസിആർജി തുടങ്ങിയവയും നിഷേധിക്കപ്പെടും. ഇങ്ങനെ ഈ നിയമം പ്രകാരം സ്ത്രീധനത്തിന്റെ പേരിൽ ഭാര്യ മരണപ്പെട്ടു എന്ന കാരണം കാണിച്ച് സർവീസിൽ നിന്ന് പിരിച്ചു വിടപ്പെടുന്ന ആദ്യത്തെ സംസ്ഥാന സർക്കാർ ഉദ്യോഗസ്ഥനാണ് കിരൺ കുമാർ എന്നും മന്ത്രി പറഞ്ഞു.   

ഭാര്യയുടെ സമ്മതമില്ലാത്ത ലൈംഗിക ബന്ധം ബലാത്സംഗമെന്ന് ഹൈക്കോടതി

ഭാര്യയുടെ സമ്മതമില്ലാത്ത ലൈംഗിക ബന്ധം ബലാത്സംഗമെന്ന് ഹൈക്കോടതി

ഭാര്യയുടെ ആഗ്രഹവും അനുമതിയുമില്ലാതെയുള്ള ലൈംഗിക ബന്ധം ബലാൽസംഗമാണന്നും വിവാഹമോചനത്തിന് മതിയായ കാരണമാണന്നും കോടതി വ്യക്തമാക്കി.

ഭാര്യയുടെ ആഗ്രഹവും അനുമതിയുമില്ലാതെയുള്ള ലൈംഗിക ബന്ധം ബലാൽസംഗമാണന്ന് ഹൈക്കോടതി. ഇത് വിവാഹമോചനത്തിന് മതിയായ കാരണമാണന്നും കോടതി വ്യക്തമാക്കി. നിർബന്ധിത ലൈംഗിക ബന്ധം ഭാര്യയോടുള്ള ക്രൂരതയാണന്നും കോടതി ഉത്തരവിൽ വ്യക്തമാക്കി.

സ്ത്രീധന പീഡനവും ലൈംഗീക പീഡനവും ചൂണ്ടിക്കാട്ടി കുടുംബ കോടതി അനുവദിച്ച വിവാഹമോചന ഹർജികൾക്കെതിരായ ഭർത്താക്കൻമാരുടെ അപ്പീലുകൾ തള്ളിക്കൊണ്ടാന്ന് ജസ്റ്റീസുമാരായ എ.മുഹമ്മദ് മുഷ്താഖും കൗസർ എടപ്പഗത്തും അടങ്ങുന്ന ഡിവിഷൻ ബഞ്ചിൻ്റെ ഉത്തരവ്.

കൊച്ചി: വിവാഹ നിയമങ്ങളിൽ പൊളിച്ചെഴുത്തു വേണമെന്നും ഹൈക്കോടതി അഭിപ്രായപ്പെട്ടു. വിവാഹത്തിനും വിവാഹമോചനത്തിനുമായി മതേതരമായ പൊതു നിയമം വേണമെന്നും ഇത് കാലഘട്ടത്തിൻ്റെ ആവശ്യമാണന്നും ഹൈക്കോടതി അഭിപ്രായപ്പെട്ടു. സമുദായ നിയമങ്ങൾക്കനുസരിച്ചുള്ള വിവാഹമാകാമെങ്കിലും എല്ലാ വിവാഹങ്ങളും നിയമ വിധേയമാക്കണമെന്നും കോടതി നിർദേശിച്ചു.

law governing them, requires a waiting period. Section 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

Bechu Kurian Thomas, J.:— Death of a marriage takes place slowly in most cases. Small bickerings transform into longer squabbles and then turn into unending fights over a period of time and ultimately, end in a court of law as divorce proceedings. in certain rare cases, like the one on hand, death of a marriage takes place overnight. However, law compels them to wait for one year before they can even present a petition for divorce.

2. The parties to the marriage involved in this case, stayed together only on their wedding night. to put an end to the misery of two irreconcilable souls, law governing them, requires a waiting period. Section 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter for brevity referred to as “The Act”) requires that one year must elapse since the date of marriage, for presenting a petition for divorce. Together, they sought a waiver of the said period of one year. Family Court refused. They seek the intervention of this Court to come to their aid.

3. The factual narration, as stated in this petition challenging the refusal of the Family Court to grant permission to present the petition for dissolution of marriage even before the lapse of one year, can be described in brief as follows.

4. The marriage was consecrated on 7.11.2019 as per the Hindu religious rites. They remained together only on their wedding night. The 2 petitioner left the house of the 1 petitioner in the morning of the day after the marriage and thereafter they have been living separately. They had no physical relationship and have not been able to arrive at a consensus regarding their future life together. in spite of several attempts at mediation through relatives, the only consensus that they could arrive at, was to dissolve their marital tie. While seeking leave to institute the divorce petition, after waiving the time period of one year, stipulated under Section 14 of the Act, petitioners state that both parties had no mental stress in arriving at the conclusion to separate and on the contrary, they state that, continuing their relationship causes greater mental trauma and agony.

5. Petitioners jointly filed an application on 11.1.2020 before the Family Court, Palakkad seeking permission to file a petition for divorce. by order dated 25.1.2020 in I.A. No. 113 of 2020 in Unnumbered Op of 2020, the said court dismissed the application stating that from the averments in the petition, it is seen that, the parties have decided to prefer the joint petition for divorce without even living together. the learned Judge further observed that “avoiding the marriage solemnized customarily after one day or one week as if they are removing their coat because of the ego of the parties is not something which is contemplated by the law and it will not augur well to the society also”. According to the learned Judge, the decision to part with is not a matured and well considered one. this original petition is filed challenging the said order.

6. We have heard Sri. M. Sasindran, learned counsel for the petitioners.

7. Section 14(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 reads as follows:

“14 No petition for divorce to be presented within one year of marriage.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, it shall not be competent for any court to entertain any petition for dissolution of a marriage by a decree of divorce, unless at the date of the presentation of the petition one year has elapsed since the date of the marriage:

Provided that the court may, upon application made to it in accordance with such rules as may be made by the High Court in that behalf, allow a petition to be presented before one year has elapsed since the date of the marriage on the ground that the case is one of exceptional hardship to the petitioner or of exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent, but if it appears to the court at the hearing of the petition that the petitioner obtained leave to present the petition by any misrepresentation or concealment of the nature of the case, the court may, if it pronounces a decree, do so subject to the condition that the decree shall not have effect until after the expiry of one year from the date of the marriage or may dismiss the petition without prejudice to any petition which may be brought after the expiration of the said one year upon the same or substantially the same facts as those alleged in support of the petition so dismissed.”

8. A reading of Section 14(1) of The Act, will show that, though the substantial provision provides a restriction in entertaining an application for dissolution of a marriage before the lapse of one year from the date of marriage, the proviso permits the court to grant leave to present the petition before the lapse of one year from the date of marriage, if the case is one of exceptional hardship to the petitioner or of exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent. the proviso to the section creates two instances where the court can grant leave to excuse time limit i.e., exceptional hardship to the petitioner or exceptional depravity to the respondent.

9. It is common knowledge that none enters into a marriage for the purpose of dissolving it. Certainly, at the time when the marriage vow is taken or the knot is tied, the intention is to create a permanent bond. However, human nature being a complex one, the error in judgment could be realized instantly or belatedly. When that error in judgment is realized, instantly, as it has happened in the present case, a window is provided by law, through the proviso, against the bar under Section 14(1) of the Act, for persons like the petitioners, to shorten their mental trauma by seeking permission to waive the one year period, of course, on satisfying the conditions stipulated.

10. What is an exceptional hardship to the petitioner and what would be the exceptional depravity for the respondent, are matters which the court will have to identify, based on the factual situation that arise in each individual case. These two terms cannot be defined or explained in a straight-jacket formula, but will depend upon the circumstances of each case. Allegations that may be sufficient to grant a decree of divorce may not, in all cases, constitute the ‘exceptional hardship’ contemplated under the section. The factors that shall be weighed by the court while deciding a petition for grant of leave to present a petition for divorce are inter alia, reasonable probability of a reconciliation between the parties, interests of children in the marriage, as is indicated in Section 14(2) of the Act. with the above factors in mind, the terms exceptional hardship and exceptional depravity ought to be appreciated by the court by stepping into the shoes of the petitioner or the respondent, as the case may be. in our system of adversarial jurisprudence, when, parties who are discrepant in all aspects, are in accord that continuance of the relationship causes more hardship to them, in the absence of materials to the contrary, Court need not and cannot disbelieve their affirmations, especially at the initial stage of granting permission to present a petition for divorce. The power conferred under the latter part of the proviso to Section 14 of the Act is sufficient safeguard against misrepresentations or concealment in obtaining the above referred permissions.

11. In this context, it is appropriate to refer to the decision in Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur ., (2017) 8 Scc 746), where the Supreme Court held that the waiver of statutory period, contemplated under section 13B(2) of the Act is directory and that it is open to the court to exercise of discretion on the facts and circumstances of each case.

12. In the decision reported in Gijoosh Gopi v. Sruthi S. ((2012) 4 KLT 269), dealing with an identical case, where the marriage did not last even for a day and there was no consummation, this court came to the conclusion that it would be impossible for the parties to continue the relationship any further and that there was no chance of any reunion and leave was granted to present the petition for divorce before the lapse of one year.

13. In Akshara A. v. Rohin S. Raveendran ((2018) 4 KLT 984), this Courts held that, “we are of the considered opinion that the code below had failed to make a proper consideration by conducting an enquiry with respect to presence of the relevant factors mentioned as above. None of the criteria could have fetched a negative inference, if a proper consideration was made in the case at hand. the court below could have considered the factum of the deleterious effect on the continuance of the sterile marriage, on the prospects of remarriage of the parties…………… on the facts, in the case mentioned above also, the parties have not lived together and the marriage was not consummated. this court observed that, no purpose of any nature will be served by insisting the parties to wait for one year as required under S.14(1) and that such requirement would cause exceptional hardships to the parties concerned.”

14. In the decision reported in Manish Sirohi v. Smt. Meenaksh (AIR 2007 All 211), while reversing a judgment of the Family Court refusing to entertain a petition for dissolution of a marriage on the ground that one year had not elapsed since the date of marriage, it was held “it appears to us that when immediately after marriage no marital relationship developed amongst themselves and they are voluntarily inclined to withdraw relationship, their life should not be allowed to be deserted. When differences have occurred, which cannot be compromised if at this stage they are separated, they can be able to enjoy their happy marital life elsewhere. Continuance of the litigation will cause mental and physical harassment to them unnecessarily when both of them are not inclined to continue with the relationship at all.”

15. In all the above decisions, Courts have granted permission to waive the time period of one year for instituting the petition for divorce based upon the circumstances arising.

16. A reading of the petition seeking permission in the instant case, as has been narrated earlier, shows that within few hours of the marriage, the petitioners separated from their companionship. It is jointly stated that neither had they lived together as husband and wife nor did they have any physical relationship. All attempts for mediation failed and their relationship has irretrievably broken down. the very fact that they have jointly stated that continuance of their relationship would cause more stress and trauma and that there is absolutely no trace of any stress or trauma in dissolving the marriage, speaks volumes about the exceptional hardship that will be caused to the parties to the marriage, if they are statutorily compelled to wait for a further period of time so as to merely satisfy the legal prescription of expiry of one year from the date of marriage. Both of them have also stated, together, that further delaying the dissolution of marriage has a propensity to cause damage to their career as well as their future prospects of marriage. They have also affirmed that their views are irreconcilable. When, in unison they state that continuance of marriage is more traumatic than dissolution of marriage, and that they lived together as husband and wife only for few hours, it satisfies the test of exceptional hardship contemplated under the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act, to be granted the benefit of waiver of the period of one year.

17. A reading of the impugned order of the Family Court indicates that the court was moved more by general principles of morality rather than the specific case of the parties to the marriage. We cannot agree to the reasons stated in the impugned order.

18. In the aforesaid circumstances, we set aside Ext. P3 order dated 25.1.2020 in I.A. No. 113 of 2020 in Unnumbered Op of 2020 passed by the Family Court, Palakkad and grant permission to the petitioners to present joint petition for divorce by waiving the statutory period of one year prescribed under Section 14(1) of the Act.

19. The original petition is allowed as above.